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WYOMING PROCEDURAL REFORM

A PROPOSAL FOR WYOMING PROCEDURAL REFORM
FRANK

J. TRELEASE, JR.*

The legislature of the State of Wyoming has adopted, in its
most recent session, a statute giving to the Supreme Court the rulemaking power in matters relating to pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts of the State., Wyoming thus stepped in line with one
of the most significant developments in the procedure field in recent
years, and became the twenty-second state to grant its courts this
2
power.
The advantages of judicial rule-making are obvious. The judges
are certainly in a better position to understand the problems involved
in procedural matters than is the legislature. On such matters a legislative group usually accepts the judgment of its lawyer members,
or of a pressure group from the organized bar. The Wyoming court
will have the recommendations of an Advisory Committee, which
will hold hearings on the rules proposed, and will thus be insured a
wide basis of opinion and judgment upon which the rules may be
predicated. Another advantage which a rule-making court has is
that once an agreement is reached on a desirable change it is unnecessary to await a future session of the legislature, and there is no
risk of being unable to get affirmative action for reasons that have
nothing to do with the merits of the controversy. 3
The most conspicuous example of a judge-made system of procedure is that adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States
for use in the federal District Courts. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have served, ever since their adoption in 1938, as a springboard for procedural reform in the state courts. They were called
to the direct attention of every lawyer, who was forced to learn (or
be prepared to learn the minute he was engaged on a federal case)
a system of pleading embodying many of the most modern concepts
of pre-trial formulation of issues. Under the Conformity Act 4 the

proceedings in law cases in the federal courts had conformed more
or less to the current state practice. As the lawyers in many states
looked upon the new Rules and found them good, a new ideal of conformity arose-that state codes should be conformed to the new federal practice.
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. Admitted
to Colorado Bar, 1938, Wyoming State Bar, 1946. Member of the Colorado
Bar Association Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, 1940.
1. S. L. 1947, c. 53.
2. Gavit, Procedure in State Courts (1946) p. 75. Monograph published by the
Practising Law Institute.
3. A fuller statement of the advantages of judicial rule-making is found in
Gavit, supra N. 2.
4. Rev. Stat. §914, 28 U.S.C. §724.
*
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Arizona, in 1940, and Colorado and New Mexico, in 1941, adopted
rules substantially in the form of the Federal Rules, even preserving the identical numbering. Under this same impetus other states
have revised their pleading systems substantially, although the Rules
themselves, or even their spirit, were not followed.5 Still others have
adopted individual reforms inspired by the Rules (Wyoming did
this in regard to joinder of parties and claims)6 and in many other
states the bar associations have made studies of the desirability of
7
overhauling their procedural systems.
This paper is based upon the premise that the Federal Rules are
at least a desirable starting point for discussion of improvements
to our state procedure. In outline, it will attempt to point up for
the reader the differences between the Wyoming and federal practice
on some major principles of pleading, to suggest some reforms going
beyond the Federal Rules and to summarize some procedural devices
available in the federal courts that are not now open to the Wyoming
practitioner. The text of the Federal Rules, as quoted below, include
amendments adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States on
December 27, 1946, which will take effect on the day which is three
months subsequent to the adjournment of the first regular session of
the 80th Congress, but if that day is prior to September 1, 1947, then
on September 1, 1947.8 All references to "Sec. 3-"
are, of course,
to the Code of Civil Procedure as published in 1 Wyoming Compiled
Statutes, 1945.
PLEADINGS ALLOWED

Rule 7 (a). There shall be a
Sec. 3-1203. The only pleadcomplaint and an answer; and
ings allowed are:
there shall be a reply to a counterclaim denominated as such;
1. Petition;
• . . No other pleading shall be
2. Demurrer;
allowed, except that the court
3. Answer;...
may order a reply to an an4. Reply.
swer...
The Rule cuts off the pleadings at the answer, in the usual case, one
step short of the Wyoming procedure. At common law, when the emphasis was placed upon reaching a single issue, pleadings might go
through the stages of declaration, plea, replication, rejoinder, surrejoinder, rebutter, and surrebutter. The code de-emphasized the
necessity for reaching a single narrow issue and intended that the
parties should place their views of the facts on the record as concisely and quickly as possible. 9 Should new matter appear in the
5.

See comments of Circuit Judge Charles E. Clark on the Alabama and Texas
rules, Texas and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1941) 20 Tex. L. Rev. 4.
6. 1 Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, §§3-613, 3-701.
7. The Index of Legal Periodicals (1937-1946) indicates published discussion in
law reviews and bar journals of 21 states.
8. Rule 86(b) as amended, 6 Fed. Rules Dec. 249.

9. Clark, Code Pleading, (1928) p. 479.
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reply, it would be deemed controverted by denial or avoidance.o In
about ten American jurisdictions the codes have eliminated the reply
except where it was in fact an answer to a counterclaim," and the
draftsmen of the Rule felt that in view of the broad allegations contemplated by other rules, opposing pleadings beyond the answer were
not useful and were only a source of delay.12 Fair notice of the opponent's case is usually given in his first pleading, and should a defendant be sincerely in doubt as to how his defense will be avoided, upon
a proper showing the court will order that a reply be made.
Under Sections 3-1318 and 3-1402. a reply is necessary only
where the answer contains "new matter". This places on the plaintiff the burden of correctly analyzing the answer to determine whether the defense is affirmative or negative in character. This decision
is in many cases difficult to make, as will be discussed later in connection with the answer. Under Rule 7 (a) the plaintiff is protected
from the peril of erroneously predicting whether or not the court
will agree with him in a conclusion that the answer was negative in
character and hence needed no reply.13
THE COMPLAINT OR PETITION

Sec. 3-1301. The first pleadRule 8 (a). A pleading which
sets forth a claim for relief,
ing on the part of the plaintiff
whether an o r i g i n a l claim,
shall be the petition, which must
contain:
counterclaim, crossclaim, or
third-party claim, shall contain
... (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief....
Rule 8 (e) (1). Each aver2. A statement of the facts
ment of a pleading shall be simconstituting the cause of action
ple, concise, and direct. No techin ordinary and concise lannical forms of pleading or moguage; ...
tions are required.
The Wyoming statute contains the statement uniformly found
in the codes. The Federal Rule contains two significant variations
from the traditional language-there is no mention of "facts" and
the word "claim" is substituted for "cause of action".
Why was the simple term "fact" so carefully avoided? Professor
Pomeroy stated the code ideal of pleading in his famous dogma: "...
the allegations must be of dry, naked, actual facts, while the rules of
law applicable thereto, and the legal rights and duties arising therefrom, must be left entirely to the courts." 4 The difficulty is that
10.
11.
12,
13.
14.

1 Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, §3-1402.
Clark, Code Pleading (1928) p. 480.
Clark, Simplified Pleading, p. 15. (Judicial Administration Monograph, Series
A, No. 18, published by the American Bar Association).
See Iba v. Central Association of Wyoming (1895) 5 Wyo. 355, 40 Pac. 527,
rehearing den. 42 Pac. 20.
Pomeroy, Code Remedies (5th Ed. 1929) p. 640.
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we all know that many allegations soaked throughout with rules of
law and clothed with legal implications of rights and duties are acceptable to the courts as "facts":
"Note the technical legal terms: 'Possession'; 'belonging to the plaintiff'; 'authority'; 'sold'; 'converted'; 'lawfully possessed'; 'forcibly took'; 'carried away'. Obviously
only a legally trained person can tell what is meant. It may
be asked: "Are these statements . . . 'statements of fact' or
are they merely 'conclusions of law'?" The answer obviously is that they are both. The statement that the plaintiff
was 'lawfully possessed' of goods in question is very properly interpreted as an assertion that some one of a large
number of shifting and varying groups of factual events had
taken place, the net legal consequence of which was that the
plaintiff was 'lawfully possessed' of goods. Any one of a
large number of combinations of events will, of course, result in conferring 'possession'-as distinguished from mere
physical custody-upon a person. Proof of any such combination of events will be proof of the 'possession'. The approved form of statement thus leaves out much of the 'concrete particularity' of the events 'as they occurred'. Any
statmeent will necessarily do that. The only question is, has
the statement left out so much that it is not sufficient fairly
to apprise court and counsel on the other side of what the
plaintiff expects to rely upon? At this point we come to the
crux of the matter. How much is enough?"'
The lawyer knows from precedent that "possession", "reasonable" and "negligently" are statements of ultimate fact, although
analysis shows that he knows these things only because he is a lawyer.
As his client relates a series of events he thinks, more or less automatically, "The driver of the car failed to use what the courts have
called due care when he drove blindly into the intersection, therefore he drove negligently", and his pleading states only his summary
or conclusion: That defendant negligently managed his automobile.
On the other hand, he knows from precedent that he must not summarize a transaction as "fraudulent" in his pleading even though
his reasoning is much the same: "When the salesman falsely stated
that the car had just been overhauled, thus deliberately inducing
plaintiff to buy it, his conduct was what the courts have called fraudulent." The lawyer may learn these precedents, but they solve only
the easy cases. When he seeks to restrain the collection of taxes,
should he follow the negligence analogy and say that the Board of
Equalization acted "arbitrarily", in adding property to the tax roll,
or should he, as in cases of fraud, set out in minute detail the substratum of circumstances ?6 Can he characterize a transaction as
15.
16.

Cook, "Facts" and "Statements of Fact" (1937) 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 233, 242.
The latter. Ricketts v. Crewdson (1905) 13 Wyo. 284, 79 Pac. 1042, rehear-

ing den. 81 Pac. 1.
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"ultra vires" or "in bad faith"?:7 Can he conclude that certain property is a "fixture" and "part of the realty"?18
The same problem, approached from the opposite direction, leads
to criticism of the pleader not because he was too general, but because he was too particular and pleaded not facts but evidence.,s The
channel of ultimate fact between the Scylla of conclusion of law and
the Charibdis of evidence is a narrow one. Even though the expert
attorney may successfully navigate it, it is a rare case in which he
can plead so perfectly that his opponent will fail to interpose a demurrer or motion under fear of being accused of frivolity or sham.
The problem is largely one of style, of the degree of particularity of
statement that shall be required of the pleader. Under the Code,
plaintiff may have a meritorious claim, defendant and his attorney
may be fully informed of all details of the case, yet delay and expense may occur because plaintiff's attorney used the wrong rhetoric.
Would the adoption of the Rules ease the pleader's burden?
Rule 9 (b) would give some specific relief: "In all averments of
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge and
other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally." It
seems clear that the framers of the Rules thought that general relief
was provided also.2o ". . . The Federal Rules have avoided one of
the sore spots of code pleading. The federal courts are not hampered
by the morass of decisions as to whether a particular allegation is
one of fact, evidence, or law".a2 While this statement has been quoted
and followed,22 several lower federal courts have criticized pleaders
for too much generality of language3 and have stricken some evidentiary matter from pleadings.24 These cases do not necessarily
indicate that the framers' intentions have been subverted by reactionary judges. Poor draftsmanship is still poor draftsmanship, and
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

No. Edwards v. Cheyenne (1911) 19 Wyo. 110, 114 Pac. 677, rehearing
den. 122 Pac. 900.
Yes. Anderson v. Englehart (1910) 18 Wyo. 409, 108 Pac. 977.
School District No. 14 v. School District No. 21 (1937). (On petition for
rehearing) 51 Wyo. 370, 384, 71 P. (2d) 137.
Gavit, The New Federal Rules and State Procedure (1939) 25 A. B. A. J.
367, 370.
1 Moore's Federal Practice (1938) p. 553.
McCleod v. Cohen-Ehricks Corp. (S.D.N.Y., 1939) 28 F. Supp. 103; Dioguardi
v. Durning (C.A.A. 2d, 1944) 139 F. (2d) 774.
Louisiana Farmers' Protective Union v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.
(C.C.A. 8th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 419 (Pleader should do more than allege

violation of anti-trust act in terms of statute); American Broadcasting Co.

v. Wahl Co. (S.D.N.Y., 1940) 36 F. Supp. 167 (Claim that defendant infringed
copyrighted radio program, held too general to apprise court of situation);
Keegan v. Ruppert (S.D.N.Y., 1941) 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 8a25, Case 1 (action
against two defendants for wages failed to state whether they employed
plaintiff jointly or at different periods of time).
24. Satink v. Holland (D.N.J., 1939) 28 F. Supp. 67; Vignovich v. Great Lakes
S. S.Co. (W.D.N.Y., 1942) 7 Fed. Rules Serv. 8a.25, Case 12, 3 Fed. Rules

Dec. 69.
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the judges have at least decided the cases not on metaphysical distinctions between evidence, fact and law, but have applied pragmatic
tests of whether the complaint is so general that it fails to afford
fair notice to the defendant2s, or whether it is so prolix that it cannot
be called "a short and plain statement"' 6 that is "simple, concise and
direct".27 While these tests cannot operate automatically to solve
the pleader's problem in advance, their use involves practical considerations that should make it easier to foresee the action of a practical judge.
The Rule also differs from the code, as noted above, in abandoning the phrase "cause of action" and substituting the word "claim".
Here again the draftsmen of the Rule sought to avoid conflicting and
confusing definitions framed by the judges under the codes.28 As
said by Mr. Justice Cardozo:
"A 'cause of action' may mean one thing*for one purpose and something different for another. It may mean one
thing when the question is whether it is good upon demurrer,
and something different when there is a question of the
amendment of a pleading or of the application of the principle of res judicata. Cf. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v.
Schendel, 270 U. S. 611, 617; Baltimore S. S. Co. v. Phillips,
274 U. S. 316, 321. At times and in certain contests, it is
identified with the infringement of a right or the violation
of a duty. At other times and in other contests, it is a concept of a law of remedies, the identity of the cause being
then dependent on that of the form of action or the writ.
Another aspect reveals it as something separate from writs
and remedies, the group of operative facts out of which a
grievance has developed. This court has not committed itself to the view that the phrase is susceptible of any single
of the context or of the
definition that will be independent
29
relation to be governed. "
These different meanings of this simple phrase have caused a
great deal of confusion, especially when transferred out of their
original contexts and used in one of the other situations. It was the
hope of the framers that the elimination of the words might give
the courts an opportunity for a fresh start and thus eliminate the
confusion.
One of the least utilitarian outgrowths of the concept of a cause
of action as being limited by the legal right sought to be enforced
is the development of the doctrine of the theory of the pleadings:
25. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. (D.N.J., 1941) 38 F. Supp. 643.
26.
27.
28.

Purcell v. Summers (E.D.S.C., 1940) 34 F. Supp. 421 (Complaint of 39 paragraphs and answer of 40 paragraphs).
Vignovich v. Great Lakes S.S. Co., supra N. 24; Buckley v. Altheimer (N.D.
Ill., 1942) 6 Fed Rules Serv. 8a.25, Case 1, 2 Fed. Rules Dec. 285 (260-page
complaint).
1 Moore's Federal Practice (1938) p. 145.

29. United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co. (1933) 288 U. S. 62, 77 L. Ed. 619,
53 Sup. Ct. 276. (Footnotes omitted).
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"It is an established rule of pleading that a complaint must proceed
upon some definite theory, and on that theory the plaintiff must
succeed if he succeeds at all".3° Of course every lawyer must have
some theory of law upon which he intends to base his case. He cannot
expect to throw a group of facts at a judge and expect the court to
work out a theory when he cannot, but a real problem arises where
it is necessary to shift theories at the trial, because some of the facts
relied upon do not develop as hoped for, or where the law is unsettled
and the judge seems disinclined to adopt a particular theory. Can a
shift be made to an alternative theory, or will a new "cause of action"
become involved in the case preventing amendment? A majority
of the states would not allow the shift; the plaintiff must bring a
new action.3, More liberal courts have said that "an applicant for
justice is not to be turned out of the temple of justice, scourged with
costs, because he happened to come in at one door instead of
another".32
The Wyoming Supreme Court has quoted language from Corpus
Juris which would seemingly require the application of the stricter
rule, in a case where plaintiff framed his petition so as to recover
on a contract theory and attempted to switch to recover pursuant to
a statutory right. 3 The shift in theory was attempted on appeal and
another trial was a necessity. The court did not actually apply the
strict doctrine, but sent the case back for a new trial after appropriate amendment of the pleadings, and based its decision primarily
on the fact that defendant had no notice of the second theory. In a
later case 34 the court allowed the plaintiff to recover on either a tort
or contract theory, where his pleadings contained facts that would
support either rule of liability.
In Finley v. Pew3" where the question involved was the propriety
of an amendment under Sec. 3-1704, which permits an amendment
conforming the pleadings to the facts proved when it "does not
change substantially the claim or defense", the court stated that "the
tests sometimes applied . . . . are first, whether the same evidence
will support both pleadings; second, whether the same measure of
damages is applicable in both cases; and, third, whether a recovery
on the amended pleading will operate to bar a recovery upon the
other". The first requirement suggested by the court is much too
strict since obviously there would be no necessity for an amendment
if the proof conformed to the original pleading. This requirement
was not actually followed by the court, which allowed a shift from
Mescall v. Tully (1883) 91 Ind. 96.
Clark, Code Pleading (1928) p. 177.
Brown v. Baldwin (1907) 46 Wash. 106, 89 Pac. 483.
School District No. 14 v. School District No. 21 (1937) (on petition for rehearing) 51 Wyo. 370, 384, 71 P. (2d) 137.
34. Diamond Cattle Co. v. Clark (1937) 52 Wyo. 265, 74 P. (2d) 857.
35. (1922) 28 Wyo. 342, 205 Pac. 310, 206 Pac. 148.

30.
31.
32.
33.
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an implied contract theory to an express contract theory, necessarily
requiring some difference in the evidence. The second test is likewise
too strict since very often a change in theory may result in a change
in the measure of damages, but in a contested case this should be immaterial. The third test is valid, and should be the only one used,
provided that the opposing party is given opportunity to meet the
new cause in case of surprise. Like the Federal Rules, this section
of the statute avoids "cause of action" and substitutes "claim". It
is possible that this could have been a deliberate attempt to avoid the
operation of the rule against amending from one cause of action
(theory) to another.
The federal courts have on the whole treated the "claim" as not
requiring theory pleading 3r and have been liberal in allowing shifts
in plaintiff's theory 37 but have not condoned pleadings so confused
and mixed that the court is not only uncertain as to the plaintiff's
theory, but also as to whether he is entitled to any remedy.3While a change to the federal rule would have a major effect in
a strict "theory of the pleadings" state, Wyoming's liberal treatment
of the problem already approaches the federal result despite the
unfortunate language from C. J. and the unnecessarily strict tests
suggested in Finley v. Pew.
ANSWER

Form of Denials
Rule 8 (b). A party shall state
in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted
and shall admit or deny the
averments upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of an averment, he
shall so state and this has the
effect of a denial. Denials shall
fairly meet the substance of the
averments denied. When a
pleader intends in good faith to
deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall
specify so much of it as is true
and material and shall deny only
36.

37.
38.

Section 3-1311.
shall contain:

The answer

1. A general or specific denial
of each material allegation of
the petition controverted by the
defendant.

Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co. (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 974;
Cohen v. Randall (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 137 F. (2d) 441, cert. den. 320 U.S. 796.
A few early cases required that plaintiff's theories be identified. Atwater v.
North American Coal Corp. (S.D.N.Y., 1939) 2 Fed. Rules Serv. 8a.25, Case
2; Baird v. Dassau (S.D.N.Y., 1940) 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 8a.25, Case 1.
International Ladies Garment Workers' Union v. Donnelly Garment Co.
C.C.A. 8th, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 561; Nester v. Western Union Telegraph Co.
(S.D.Cal., 1938) 25 F. Supp. 478.
Catanzaritti v. Bianco (M.D.Pa., 1938) 25 F. Supp. 457; Johnson v. Occidental
Life Insurance Co. (D. Minn., 1941) 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 8a.25, Case 2.
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the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith to controvert all the averments of the
preceding pleading, he may
make his denials as specific denials of designated averments
or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the averments
except s u c h designated averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he
does so intend to controvert all
its averments, including averments of the grounds upon
which the court's jurisdiction
depends, he may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
The code makes no mention of denials of information and belief,
but apparently they are widely used in the Wyoming practice. This
type of denial is of great utility to the conscientious pleader, who
may hesitate to verify that a statement in the petition is untrue, but
who is in doubt as to the facts and is unwilling to admit the statement. Such a denial will have the effect of putting the pleader on
his proof.
In the one Wyoming case involving such a denial 39 the defendant, who was obviously in a position to know the facts, denied information or knowledge sufficient to form a belief. The court held
this pleading to be improper, but on the basis that such an allegation was not open to one in his position. The inference is that the
form could be used in a proper case. 40 Such denials may also be validated by the familiar rule of statutory construction, that where a
statute has been borrowed from another jurisdiction the construction placed upon it by the courts will be presumed to have been
adopted along with the statute. In 1860, long prior to the adoption
by Wyoming of the Ohio code, it had been construed in State ex rel.
Treadwell v. Hancock County.4 1 The Ohio court approved a denial
of information and belief as being authorized by the equivalent section to Wyoming's Sec. 3-1604 which permits a verification to state
that the affiant merely believes the facts in the pleading to be true.
The Federal Rule permits only the denial of knowledge or infor39. Appel v. State (1900) 9 Wyo. 187, 61 Pac. 1015.
40.

To be distinguished is the situation in Creamery Package Co. v. Cheyenne
Ice Cream Co. (1940) 55 Wyo. 277, 100 P. (2d) 116, where plaintiff in the
reply stated that it neither affirmed or denied an allegation of the answer.
Held, this was equivalent to an admission under §3-1402. Obviously the in-

tent was to put the defendant on his proof, but the wrong formula of words

was used and plaintiff put itself squarely within the rule that what is not
"controverted" is taken as true. The denial of information and belief clearly

41.

controverts the allegation.
11 Ohio St. 183.
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mation sufficient to form a belief. Some states allow the companion
denial on information or according to information. 42 These denials
may take care of the exceptionally fastidious pleader who, although
lacking definite knowledge, has some information contrary to the
allegation and has formed a belief. Apparently the framers of the
Rule felt such a denial was of doubtful utility, since either a direct
denial or a denial of information would fit the case and force the
pleader to prove his allegation. There is no requirement that the
denying opponent must bring out definite proof.
The adoption of the Rule would also legitimatize another common practice of the Wyoming practitioner, the qualified general denial: "Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph one
of the petition, and denies each and every other allegation in the
petition". This form of denial has been criticized as unauthorized
like Wyoming's. mention only a "general" or a
under codes which,
"specific" denial.A3 From the viewpoint of simplicity and brevity,
the qualified general denial seems highly desirable, and its use is a
sure escape from the negative pregnant trap which lurks wherever
a specific denial is used to controvert an allegation that is in any way
modified.
Rule 8 (b) places a desirable limitation on the use of the general
denial. It may be used only where the pleader in good faith intends
to controvert all the averments of the preceeding pleading, and his
attention is specifically called to Rule 11. The latter requires the attorney's signature on the pleading and makes it a certificate that
there is good ground for the pleading and that it is not interposed
for delay, and provides for the striking of improper pleadings and
possible disciplinary action where the Rule has been willfully violated. The general denial, as commonly misused, is an evasive form
of answer, which does not point out the matters in dispute, and
wastes the time of the court." It forces the pleader to go to unnecessary trouble, time and expense in marshalling and presenting evidence on every point in his case, whether or not it is sincerely disputed. A verified general denial is technically correct only where the
defendant, honestly believes that every allegation in the petition is a
complete fabrication, surely an unusual situation. Justice would
be swifter and cheaper if defendants, as well as plaintiffs, are required to give adequate notice of the matters upon which they intend
to rely, by limiting their denials to the allegations that they seriously
intend to controvert.
42.
43.

California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada. Clark, Code Pleading (1928) p. 404.
Clark, Code Pleading (1928) p. 397. Clark cites several decisions from the
Ohio lower courts as criticizing the practice.

44. Lapides v. Pecoraro (1927) 130 Misc. 365, 224 N.Y. Supp. 101.
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Affirmative Defenses
Sec. 3-1311. The answer shall
Rule 8 (c). In pleading to a
contain: ...
preceding p 1 e a d i n g, a party
shall set forth affirmatively ac2. A statement of any new
cord and satisfaction, arbitraconstituting a defense,
matter
tion and award, assumption of
counterclaim, or set-off in ordirisk, contributory negligence,
nary and concise language.
discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by
fellow servant, laches, license,
payment, release, res judicata,
statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. ...
One of the most troublesome problems facing the attorney for
the defense is whether he may prove a particular defense under a
general denial, or whether he must set it out in his pleadings. Loosely
45
stated rules to the effect that what a party pleads he must prove
make him hesitate to take up a burden that he might avoid, yet if he
guesses wrong and relies on a denial he may find his evidence excluded.
The difference between affirmative and negative ought to be
obvious, but it is not when it comes to pleading. The state courts
have split widely on whether the statute of fraud is an affirmative
defense, or whether it may be proved under a denial, whether or not
the defendant must plead the bar of the statute of limitations, whether contributory negligence is a defense or its lack is a part of plaintiff's case. The adoption of the Federal Rule would settle the law
clearly in nineteen of the most common situations, many of which
have not yet been adjudicated in Wyoming. and would thus eliminate much uncertainty. It would change the Wyoming rule on the
statute of frauds4 °, but on the whole the notice function of pleading
would be given added emphasis in that defendants would be required
to give fair warning of their contentions.
The rule does no more than provide for the more common cases,
and there is still room for controversy on what is "other matter constituting an avoidance or affiirmative defense". The test most usually applied is that of consistency: If the defense is inconsistent with
the facts alleged in the petition, it may be proved under a denial; if
they are consistent, so that both may stand together, the defense is
new matter that must be pleaded.47 The Wyoming Supreme Court
"If he alleges a fact that is denied, he must prove it." First National Bank
v. Ford (1923) 30 Wyo. 110, 118, 216 Pac. 691.
46. Williams-Haywood Shoe Co. v. Brooks (1901) 9 Wyo. 424, 64 Pac. 342, and
Davidson v. Nicholson (1928) 37 Wyo. 412, 263 Pac. 605, allow the statute of
frauds to be raised under a general denial.

45.

47.

Clark, Code Pleading (1928)

p. 415.
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has applied the test of consistency to several situations 48, yet has recognized that public policy and fair play may require that some defenses must be pleaded although inconsistent with the petition 4g.
Perhaps the best solution yet offered is found in the Illinois Civil
Practice Act: ". . . Any ground of defense, whether affirmative or
not, which if not expressly stated in the pleading, would be likely to
take the opposite party by surprise, must be plainly set forth in the
' '5
answer or reply. 0
One other point with reference to the form of the answer deserves mention. Under Rule 8(e) (2) a party "may also state as
many separate . . . defenses as he has regardless of consistency ... "
Under a dictum of the Wyoming court,- ' defenses must be so far
consistent that proof of one must not necessarily disprove the other.
This requirement stems from the code ideal of fact pleading, but it
also comes perilously close to the "theory of the pleadings" doctrine
discussed above. The common law courts first allowed the defendant
but a single defense, but under the "Statute of Anne' ' 52 the defendant was allowed to plead "as many several matters thereto as he shall
think necessary for his defense." No requirement of consistency was
enforced, but leave of court had to be first obtained, and costs might
be charged to the defendant unless he had had probable cause to plead
a defense upon which the jury rendered an adverse verdict. The
familiar law school example of inconsistent defenses is the plea to a
declaration of trover which alleged that defendant borrowed a pot
and returned it broken: defendant did not borrow the pot, it was not
broken when he returned it, it was broken when he borrowed it. Certainly these are inconsistent, if pure logic is to be applied, yet all of
these defenses may be relied upon in good faith in the same suit. Perhaps the circumstances of the original transfer of possession might
have given defendant the idea that the transaction was a gift, not a
loan. Should his evidence fail on this point, he may contend that certain chips and cracks do not make the pot broken, and should he fail
to convince the court of this, there may nevertheless be a genuine
controversy over whether or not these chips and cracks were in the
pot at the time he first received it from the plaintiff. If the rule of
consistency is applied it forces the defendant to elect, early in the
case, the one theory upon which he will stand, at a time when he is
48.

49.
50.
51.

Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Summers, (1912) 19 Wyo. 441, 120 Pac. 185
(fraud in the execution allowed under denial of contract); Tha. v. Central
Association of Wyoming, (1895) 5 Wyo. 355, 40 Pac. 527, 42 Pac. 20 (Allegation of title in defendant held not new matter).
First National Bank v. Ford (1923) 30 Wyo. 110, 216 Pac. 691.
Jones Ill. Stat. Ann. 104.043(4).
Wyoming Construction and Development Co. v. Buffalo Lumber Co. (1917)

25 Wyo. 158, 166 Pac. 391.
52. 4 Ann, c. 16, §4 (1705).
53. Clark, Code Pleading (1928) p. 435.
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not sure which theory is sound in fact or law, and he may be deprived
of a valid and truthful defense.
The only requirement that should be enforced against a defendant is that he be as truthful as his knowledge of the circumstances
will permit.53 If his answer is obviously false and inconsistent to the
point of obfuscating the issue, let it be stricken as are other sham
pleadings, but pure logic should not be employed to deprive a defendant of his best chance of obtaining justice.
DEMURRERS AND MOTIONS

In his monograph on Simplified Pleading Judge Clark gives the
history of pre-trial tactics and offers the complete abolition of the
demurrer as a solution:
"The common-law objections, other than pleas in bar
on the facts (traverse or confession and avoidance), could be
raised by plea in abatement and by demurrer, general or
special. The motion, too, was available, though not of significant use, due to the wide scope of the other devices. It
is obvious, however, that each of these preliminary devices
might easily constitute a battle in itself, so that in ordinary
course two or three extensive hearings and decisions, involving all the paraphernalia of calendar assignment, briefs,
arguments, rulings and formal orders, could be had in advance of trial, and could, indeed, be repeated as often as
amendment of the pleadings was had. Of course, any attempt to enforce or require detail in the pleadings against
the resistance of counsel would inevitably lead to such repleading, with new objections. Since we have seen, the
pleadings really were not binding as final admissions on the
parties at the trial, after literally years of these preliminary skirmishes the litigation might not have progressed towards real adjudication. In an attempt to shorten this process most of the codes provide that the plea in abatement
for matters outside the complaint must be a part of the answer, thus eliminating one separate hearing state. But the
motion assumed great prominence-either the motion to expunge or strike out or the motion to make more definite and
certain-and consequently under the codes there was little,
if any, substantial gain in reduction of preliminary sparring.
"One of the first planks of pleading reform, therefore,
has usually been the abolition of the demurrer. Hence the
federal equity rules and those of New York and other states
did formally abolish the demurrer. The difficulty is that a
substitution of the motion to dismiss, sharply distinguished
from all other motions, amounts in essence to not much more
than a change of name, without meeting the problem. Real
reform must go further. It is to be found in the English system, Order 25, Rules 1-4, which is simple and direct and apparently quite satisfactory. Here all objections are stated
in the ordinary pleading-in the answer when made by a defendant-and, upon request of the parties or order of the
court, may be called up for preliminary hearing and disposition if in the opinion of the judge decision will substantially
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dispose of the whole action or a distinct part thereof. There
is further power to strike out a pleading summarily as disclosing no reasonable cause or answer or as being frivolous
or vexatious. This latter power is availed of only in the
clearest of cases. Obviously this system effectively eliminates all preliminary skirmishes except where the judge
sees a real possibility of advancing the final adjudication by
them .A party is still protected, however, as to points he
really believes in by the opportunity to bring all of them
up at the actual trial."5

Demurrers
Rule 7 (c). Demurrers, pleas,
and exceptions for insufficiency
of a pleading shall not be used.
Rule 12(b). Every defense,
in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading ... shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required,
except that the following defenses may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion: (1)
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency
of process, (5) insufficiency of
service of process, (6) failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure
to join an indispensable party.
A motion making any of these
defenses shall be made before
pleading if a further pleading is
permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined
with one or more other defenses
or objections in a responsive
pleading or motion. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief
to which the adverse party is
not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may assert at
the trial any defense in law or
fact to the claim for relief. If,
on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss
for failure of the pleading to
state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, matters outside
the pleading are presented to
54.

Sec. 3-1303. The defendant
may demur to the petition only
when it appears on its face
either:
1. That the court has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, or the subject of the
action;
2. That the plaintiff has not
legal capacity to sue;
3. That there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause;
4. That there is a misjoinder
of parties plaintiff;
5. That there is a defect of
parties, plaintiff or defendant;
6. That several causes of action are improperly joined;
7. That separate causes of action against several defendants
are improperly joined;
8. That the petition does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Sec. 3-2108. . . . the court
may, at any time, hear a demurrer or a motion and may, by rule,
prescribe the time of hearing
the demurrers and motions.

Clark, Simplified Pleading, pp. 16-17 (Judicial Administration Monographs.
Series A, No. 18. Published by American Bar Association.) Footnotes
omitted.
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and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as
one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule
56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent
to such a motion by Rule 56.
Rule 12 (d). The defenses specifically enumerated (1)- (7)
in subdivision (b) of this rule,
whether made in a pleading or
by motion, and the motion for
judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be
heard and determined before
trial on application of any
party, unless the court orders
that the hearing and determination thereof be deferred until
the trial.
It can be seen that under the Federal procedure the pleader has
an initial option to take the same steps permitted by the Code or to
follow the English system and set out in his answer his objection
that no claim is stated. However, a strong-minded judge may, under
Rule 12 (d), order the hearing on the motion deferred until the trial,
and thus impose the English system on the parties.
The desirability of abolishing the demurrer may depend upon
one's view of the primary function of that pleading-whether as a
device for delaying the plaintiff and discouraging him into accepting
a smaller settlement, or as an efficacious means of adjudicating law
suits. While statistics are not available, the usual result of even a
successful demurrer would seem to be to make the plaintiff replead
what the defendant already knew, and only rarely is a case finally
disposed of by the court's ruling at the preliminary hearing. More
often the demurrer goes to a point of form which leads merely to
amendment. The result is delay and the most achieved is formal perfection in the pleadings. When a serious legal issue is presented the
tendency of lawyers is to reserve their objection in law until the trial,
then let plaintiff have both barrels at once on issues of fact and law.ss
The true abolition of the demurrer would make this practice the rule
and would eliminate preliminary sparring on matters of form. In
the case of the comparatively rare petition which states the plaintiff's version of the facts so fully and accurately that the objection of
the demurrer goes truly to a crucial point of law rather than to a
matter of form or omission, the trial may still be eliminated and the
entire case disposed of on a preliminary hearing.
55.

Clark, Code Pleading (1928) p. 371.
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The demurrer is also used to test the sufficiency of pleadings
subsequent to the petition.56 The original Rules set out no preliminary procedure for testing the sufficiency of an answer other than a
motion for judgment on the pleading which might not be applicable
if one of several affirmative defenses were good or if the defense were
coupled with a denial. This may have been due to an attempt to limit
the number of pre-trial steps, with the feeling that such an objection
could be made at the trial,9 but it seems to have been regarded by the
courts as an omission.58 Rule 12(f) has now been amended to broaden the scope of the motion to strike so that it may be used against an
insufficient defense. This amendment does add a step to the proceedings, but since in most cases the motion would be open to the plaintiff alone, who is presumably the man in a hurry, there seems to be
only slight danger that the motion will be used for purposes of delay.
One other amendment to the Rules deserves mention. The last
sentence of Rule 12 (b) now legalizes, in a sense, the "speaking demurrer". At common law and under the codes the demurrer admitted
the facts in the pleading attacked, but could not itself supply any
new fact.69 Since the pleader might carefully omit mention of a fact,
which although not a part of his case, was decisive of the action, the
demurrer's function of deciding cases on points of law is limited.
The original rules allowed "motions" to be supported with affidavits6o
and evidence61. Did this apply to motions to dismiss which had for
grounds the failure to state a claim? The point was raised in many
lower Federal Courts. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit dealt with such motions to dismiss as motions for summary
judgment under Rule 56,62 and the last sentence of Rule 12(b) now
adopts that practice. In other words, the missing fact may be added
only if there is no genuine issue as to its existence. Judgment as a
matter of law may thus be rendered on the undisputed facts whether
appearing in the complaint or pointed out in the motion.
Motion for More Definite Statement
Sec. 3-1410. When the allegaRule 12 (e). If a pleading to
tions of a pleading are so inwhich a responsive pleading is
definite and uncertain that the
permitted is so vague or ambigprecise nature of the charge or
uous that a party cannot reasondefense is not a p p a r e n t, the
ably be required to frame a re56. 1 Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, Secs. 3-1308, 3-1309.
57. Rule 12(h) has always provided that the objection of failure to state a legal
defense to a claim could be made by a later pleading, a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, or at the trial.
58. Modes of Attacking Insufficient Defenses in the Answer (1939) 1 Fed. Rules
Serv. 669; (1940) 2 Fed. Rules Serv. 640.
59. Clark, Code Pleading (1928) p. 353.
60. Rule 6(d).
61. Rule 43(e).
62. Samara v. United States (C.C. 2nd, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 594, cert. den. (1942)
317 U.S. 686; Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp. (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 124
F. (2d) 822, cert. den. (1943) 317 U.S. 695.
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court may require the pleading
sponsive pleading, he may move
to be made definite and certain
for a more definite statement beby amendment.
fore interposing his responsive
pleading. The motion shall point
out the defects complained of
and the details desired....
Prior to the 1947 amendments Rule 12(e) permitted a motion
"for a more definite statement or a bill of particularsof any matter
which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to
enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare
for trial".8- This rule was much criticized by courts and writers as
adding an unnecessary step in the proceedings, as neutralizing the
"short and plain statement" envisaged by Rule 8 (a), and as duplicating the discovery procedures available under other Rules. 64 The
amendment abolishes the bill of particulars and no longer allows the
motion for the purpose of enabling an attorney to prepare for trial.
One basic theory of the Federal Rules must be understood and
accepted before the desirability of the amendment can be conceded.
The Rules contemplate a rather general statement of the claim, but
provide very extensive methods for the discovery of details by the
use of dispositions,65 interrogatories to parties,66 production of documents, 67 and requests for admissions.c6 One aspect of the trial by
battle heritage of a lawsuit has disappeared-no longer is the evidence in the case the secret property of the party in possession, to
be sprung upon the opposition with the devastating effect at the trial.
Therefore, when defense counsel in a federal suit is confronted with
a rather general complaint, he does not move for a more definite statement and get a reply from plaintiff's lawyers, he goes about it in a
more efficient way: He asks the person who knows, by taking depositions or serving interrogatories.
These procedures for compelling the opposing party to "disclose
his case" were viewed with horror by some attorneys trained in the
older procedure, and were criticized as being too expensive for run
of the mill litigation.- The latter objection may be true of depositions on oral examination, but can be met by-the use of interrogatories
to parties and depositions on written interrogatories. The answer
to the former objection depends upon one's concept of a lawsuit-as
a contest between attorneys, with each in exclusive possession of
whatever ammunition he might have, usually different, or as an earnest attempt to do justice where each party has equal opportunity to
63.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Italics supplied.

1 Moore's Federal Practice, 1947 Supplement, pp. 286 et seq.
Rules 26 to 32.
Rule 33.
Rule 34.
Rule 36.
(1939) 6 Jour. D.C. Bar Ass'n 113-116.
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get all facts in advance and prepare and present his views of those
facts and the applicable law.
Wyoming has very liberal provisions relating to interrogatories
to parties,7 o admissions,7oA inspection and copying,7, and depositionS7 2. They do not seem to be as liberal in regard to the scope of
the examination as do the Federal Rules, nor do they provide for the
cheap deposition on written interrogatories. The dearth of annotations would not indicate that they are widely used, but they are and
have been available to the Wyoming attorney who desires discovery
before trial. Without analyzing the differences between the Wyoming
code and the Rules the question is posed as to whether the motion for
a more definite statement should not be restricted, and discovery substituted as the proper and only method of getting the details of the
charge.
Motion to Strike
Sec. 3-1409. If redundant, irRule 12 (f). Upon motion
made by a party before respondrevelant or scurrilous matter be
ing to a pleading or, if no reinserted in a pleading, it may be
stricken out on the motion of
sponsive pleading is permitted
the party prejudiced thereby;
by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within 20 days
and obscene words may be
stricken from a pleading on the
after the service of the pleading
upon him or upon the court's
motion of a party, or by the
own initiative at any time, the
court of its own motion.
court may order stricken from
any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
Little can be said with regard to the motion to strike. Insofar
as the motion is used merely to refline the form of the pleadings it
adds little, if anything, to the quick and efficient administration of
justice. 7- Insofar as it may occasionally narrow the issues, by resulting in a ruling that some line of attack is immaterial and as a matter
of law cannot affect the outcome of the case, there is doubt whether
it saves either the court or the parties any time or trouble. The immateriality could be attacked at the trial, probably less time would
be consumed than required by two hearings, one on the motion and
70.

70a.
71.
72.
73.

1 Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, Sec. 3-1503, 3-1504, 3-1505.

1 Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, Sec. 3-3116.
1 Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, Secs. 3-3118 and 3-3120.
1 Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, Secs. 3-2905 et seq.
"Perfection in pleading is rare. There may be allegatiois in the complaint
which might properly have been left out, but this kind of criticism could be
urged in all cases. Prolixity is a besetting sin of most pleaders. Courts
should deal with the substance, and not the form of the language of the
pleadings. Where no harm will result from immaterial matter not affecting
the substance, courts should hesitate to disturb a pleading. Another consideration, in such circumstances, is that to grant the motion would delay
bringing the case to a speedy trial." St. Sure, J., in Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Time Trust, Inc. (N.D.Cal., 1939) 28 F. Supp. 34, 44.
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one on the trial, and the pre-trial delay in getting to issue would be
eliminated.
What about scandalous or scurrilous matter? It should not be
allowed in pleadings, but should not some other method of dealing
with it be devised? The motion to strike may lead to a preliminary
decision that the matter questioned is scandalous, but in fact the undesirable matter stays on the record for all who care to see, and is
usually repeated in the motion. Adding a stage to the proceedings
hardly seems justified in view of the limited nature of this relief.
Perhaps the most efficient solution would be for the matter to be
brought up as a matter of discipline or reprimand at the trial, or at
least the pleadings should not be delayed by a motion for such action,
and the time to answer should not be tolled while the motion is
pending.
ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL DEVICES

Third-Party Practice.
Rule 14 (a). Before the service of his answer a defendant may move ex parte or, after the service of his answer, on
notice to the plaintiff, for leave as a third-party plaintiff to
serve a summons and complaint upon a person not a party
to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of
the plaintiff's claim against him....
This practice, often called by the name of "impleader", will in
many ways enable a single law suit to do the work of two or three.
In many situations where A sues B, who is responsible and can be
made to pay the judgment, ultimate liability will fall upon C. Thus
where a retailer warrants an article on the strength of a warranty
made to him by the wholesaler, where a land owner is held responsible for the torts of an independent contractor, where "n endorser
signs as an accommodation, or where an insurer has taken out reinsurance, a suit against the retailer, landowner, endorser or insurer
will establish his liability, but the disposition of the suit will not dispose of the entire controversy and a second suit may be required. In
some of these situations the party sued may be allowed to "vouch in"
his indemnitor by means of a notice to come in and defend the claim.
This notice will not operate as process nor make the recipient a party
to the action, but it will at least serve to make the decision in the first
case res judicata in the subsequent case against the indemnitor so
that the facts may not be relitigated.74
This partial relief is apparently available in all jurisdictions7e,
but the federal third-party practice goes a step farther and permits
the indemnitor to be made a party to the first suit, permitting all
claims arising out of the same transaction to be settled in a single
suit. Impleader has been used in England and the United States Ad74.

Cohen, Impleader (1933) 33 Col. L.Rev. 1147.

75.

Ibid.
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mirality Courts for many years7 6 and would be a valuable addition to
the Wyoming practice.
Summary Judgment
Rule 56 (a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover
upon a claim, counter-claim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of
20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
his favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion
shall be at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. A summary judgment, interloctory in character,
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
The nuisance value of defense under traditional procedure is
high. A person who has bought goods from another on credit and has
resold or consumed the same and who is sued for their value may
file, in addition to the usual motions and demurrers, an answer consisting of a general denial and perhaps a claim for breach of warranty of quality. He may then sit back, wait until the case is placed
on the jury docket and is reached for trial, force the plaintiff to prove
his case in open court under the application of all the technical rules
of evidence, and possibly defeat the claim if some mischance occurs
in the form of a lack of technical proof or loss of evidence. In the
end he need do nothing and is liable only for the original bill, interest
and an insignificant amount of costs.77 The plaintiff business man,
out of pocket his attorney fees, put to other expense including his
labor and loss of time, mutters something about shysters and the
law's delays, and next time bitterly allows a debtor to settle his bill
at 50 cents on the dollar. The attorney for the plaintiff feels badly
but can do nothing. The attorney for the defense shrugs and says he
is a hired advocate who insisted on no more than his client's legal
rights to have the case against him proved up to the hilt. Similarly,
every attorney for an insurance company or large corporation has
many times calculated the nuisance value of an unfounded law suit
'76. Ibid.

77. Finch, Summary Judgment Procedure, (1933) 19 A.B.A.J. 504.
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and paid to a claimant who is but a step above a blackmailer some
lesser sum than the cost to his client of a full-dress trial.
The usual rules against sham pleading cannot effectively deal
with this problem. An answer can be stricken as sham only if the
defense on its face is not even arguable as a bar to the action.78
The summary judgment procedure operates on the theory that
no person has a "right" to use the machinery of the courts for purposes of delay and injustice. Even though an issue of fact may be
raised by the formal pleadings, this procedural device gives the judge
a preview of the evidence and if the issue is not genuine the judge is
given the power to render judgment summarily. The court does not
try the issue on the affidavits, depositions and admissions, but only
determines if a real issue exists; if a bona fide dispute appears the
motion will be denied and the case tried in the ordinary manner. The
summary judgment should be granted only on evidence which a jury
would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would be require a
directed verdict for the moving party.79 It does not deprive the party
of a jury trial, he is not entitled to any trial where his pleadings are
mere sham and no genuine issue of fact exists.so
The summary judgment is an old and well tried device. It was
first used in the Colony of South Carolina in 1769, and today some
form of it exists in England, the English Colonies and at least
eighteen states, as well as in the federal courts.-I At first it was applied only in certain classes of cases where the claim was liquidated,
but its scope has been enlarged to cover so many cases that the Rule
takes the final step and removes all restrictions so that the remedy
may be applied wherever it may successfully dispose of a case. The
necessity of a liquidated claim is eliminated by the provision for a
trial on the sole issue of the amount of damages.
Another sub-section, Rule 56(d), provides that if on the application for a summary judgment the case is not fully disposed of the
court may conduct a pre-trial hearing at the hearing on the motion
to determine what material facts are really controverted, and shall
then make a pre-trial order specifying the real issues of fact and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Thus the
case may be partially adjudicated on the motion, the genuine issues
78.
79.
80.
81.

Ibid, p. 506.
Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp. (1944) 321 U.S. 620, 88 L.Ed. 967, 64
Sup Ct. 724.
General Inv. Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. (1923) 235 N.Y. 133,
139 N.E. 216; Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v. United States (1902)
187 U.S. 315, 23 Sup. Ct. 120, 47 L.Ed. 194.
In Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment (1928) 38 Yale L.J. 423, the
states of Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Michigan, Illinois, Deleware,
Pennsylvania, Indiana, Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, Arkansas, Tennessee,
West Virginia, and Missouri are listed. Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico
have been added to the list by their adoption of the federal practice.
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separated from the sham, and a great deal of time may be saved at
the trial.
CONCLUSION

The comparison attempted here between a few selected Federal
Rules and the related sections of the Wyoming code does not demonstrate beyond controversy that the code is all bad and out-moded
and that the Rules are all good and the last word. No modern Dickens
could write too tragic a tale based on a Wyoming Jarndyce v. Jarndyce. But the basic theories of code pleading go back to 1848 (the
date of the first New York code) and the essential elements of Wyoming procedure were first made law in 1853 (the date of the Ohio
Code.) A century later our practice is to be reexamined to see
whether it conforms to "the purpose of promoting the speedy and
efficient determination of litigation upon its merits". 2
The means of accomplishing this objective would seem to be a
system of short, simple, flexible pleadings that will serve to give fair
notice to the opposing party of the pleader's case, that will leave problems of style and form largely to the attorney, and that will not allow
the decision to be delayed by shadow-boxing techniques that accomplish no substantive benefits. To be more specific and to summarize,
it is believed that the basic theory of the Wyoming rule-making statute could be best subserved by the adoption of the follownig features
of the Federal Rules: the abolition of the reply, the substitution of
the claim for relief in the place of the cause of action, the clarification of the rules pertaining to denials and affirmative defenses, the
restriction of the motion to make more specific, and the use of the
impleader and summary judgment devices. Going beyond the Federal Rules, the demurrer by any name should be abolished, as should
the motion to strike.
The Wyoming litigant-for whose benefit the pleading rules
should be formulated--ought to be guaranteed a decision on the
merits of his case with as little delay and expense as possible. Under
our code it is possible that he may be deprived of any hearing on the
substance of his claim or defense because of a mistake in judgment
on the part of his attorney, which may consist of nothing more than
the inability to predict the action of a judge. No matter how skillful
his attorney, he can be assured that he will be delayed while technicalities of form are being ironed out, and he may be put to unnecessary expense in proving much that is not genuinely controverted.
This discussion has. of course, been fragmentary. Only a few
basic rules of pleading have been investigated, while many more remain. Left untouched are practice problems such as commencement of actions and service of process, venue and trials, judgments
and appellate review. Many subjects that are usually major planks
82.

S. L. 1947, c. 53, §1.
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in a platform of reform are already on the credit side of Wyoming's
books: free joinder of parties and actions,a3 waiver of jury trial,84
liberal amendments. 85 But the entire system should be gone over
thoroughly. Half-way measures of procedural reform are not likely
to accomplish very desirable results, and are too likely to be adopted
as a compromise between the desire for reform and the conservative
feeling that, after all, a pretty fair brand of justice has been administered for years under the old system. The danger of tinkering with
the old system is that it requires the attorney to learn new rules without obtaining the full benefit of modern procedural thinking, and it
may prejudice the bar against true reform for many years. 8 Furthermore the interrelation of different sections of the code frequently
leads to difficulties when one section is changed and in a case not
foreseen a conflict or inconsistency with another section crops up.
Many of the proposals here advocated will be resisted as going
too far. Many are on controversial points upon which differences of
opinion may exist without either side being guilty of radicalism or
ultraconservatism. Without doubt other solutions to some of these
problems are possible and feasible. The point is that a set of really
excellent rules of Wyoming procedure will require much study and
discussion. While the Federal Rules have been here used as our most
modern example, their complete adoption has not been advocated.
Many of the rules not discussed relate to purely federal procedurethese should be discarded. Undoubtedly many sections of the Wyoming Code have a peculiar value in the Wyoming practice-these
should be retained. But more is needed than a few piecemeal amendments to our code, a major overhaul is required. The Supreme Court
of the State of Wyoming and its Advisory Committee must develop
and adopt a philosophy of pleading that will run throughout all its
rules, and must promulgate rules that will translate that philosophy
into a practical and efficient mechanism for the administration of
justice.
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1 Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, §§3-613, 3-701.
1 Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, §3-2422.
1 Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, §§3-1704, 3-3202.
Clark, Texas & Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1941) 20 Tex. L.Rev. 4.

